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This article summarizes some of the United States 
Supreme Court's recent decisions in criminal law. In 
terms of its impact on federal prosecutions, the most 
important decision of the term may have been Mistretta v. 
United States, 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989), in which the Court 
upheld the sentencing guidelines promulgated under the 
Sentencing Reform Act. The guidelines were challenged 
on a number of grounds, including separation of powers 
and improper delegation of legislative authority. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Aerial Surveillance 
The defendant in Florida v. Riley, 109 S.Ct. 693 (1989), 
lived in a mobile home on five acres of rural property. A 
greenhouse was located 10 to 20 feet behind the home. A 
wire fence surrounded both structures, and a "Do not 
enter" sign had been posted. Two sides of the green-
house were enclosed. Although the other two sides were 
open, trees, shrubs, and the home obscured the view. 
Panels, some translucent and some opaque, covered the 
roof. Two panels, however, were missing. 
After receiving an anonymous tip, the local sheriff went 
to Riley's property to investigate the cultivation of mari-
juana. Because the contents of the greenhouse could not 
be viewed from the road, the sheriff used a helicopter. At 
the height of 400 feet, he saw what he thought was mari-
juana and subsequently obtained a search warrant. 
Riley moved to suppress the seized marijuana, argu-
ing that the aerial surveillance was a search, conducted 
without probable cause or a warrant. The Court rejected 
his argument. A plurality believed that the case was 
governed by California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). In 
Cirao/o a fixed-wing aircraft flew over property at 1,000 
feet, from which point marijuana was seen growing in the 
defendant's yard. The Court ruled that the observations 
made from the plane did not constitute a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because a 
person does not have a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in this context. The Court wrote: 
In an age where private and commercial flight in the 
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respon-
dent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitu-
ublic Defender Hyman Friedman 
tionally protected from being observed with the naked 
eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth Amend-
ment simply does not require the police traveling in the 
public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in 
order to observe what is visible to the naked eye. /d. at 
215. 
The plurality in Riley did not believe that a helicopter, 
flying at 400 feet, should be treated differently. Even 
though a fixed-wing plane could not travel that low, it was 
legal for a helicopter to fly at that altitude. Any member of 
the public could have rented a helicopter and viewed the 
greenhouse. The sheriff did no more. The plurality, 
however, did comment: "This is not to say that an inspec-
tion of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will always 
pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply 
because the plane is within the navigable airspace speci-
fied by law." 109 S.Ct. at 697. The plurality suggested that 
an interference with Riley's right to use the greenhouse, 
or the revelation of intimate details of the home, or undue 
noise, wind, or threat of injury might lead to a different 
result. 
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but wrote 
a separate opinion. She believed that "the plurality's 
approach rested too heavily on compliance with FAA 
regulations whose purpose is to promote air safety and 
not to protect" Fourth Amendment values. /d. Simply 
because a helicopter can view the curtilage legally at 
almost any height does not mean that a person does not 
have an expectation of privacy from such an observation. 
Riley lost, in her view, because there was reason to 
believe that there is considerable public use of the 
airspace at 400 feet. Thus, any expectation of privacy 
that he did possess was not one that society was 
prepared to accept as reasonable. She warned, however, 
that flights at lower altitudes may be sufficiently rare to 
violate reasonable expectations of privacy. 
Stop and Frisk 
Andrew Sokolow purchased two round-trip airline tick-
ets from Honolulu to Miami. United States v. Sokolow, 
109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). He paid cash, $2,100, from a roll of 
$20 bills. He did not check any luggage and appeared 
nervous. The ticket agent contacted the police, and 
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subsequent investigation revealed that the telephone 
numberlisted did riot m~ateh the name (Andrew Kray), 
under which he was traveling. Moreover, his stay in 
Miami was to last only 48 hours even though the trip from 
Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours. When he returned to 
Honolulu, he was stopped by the police, and a drug dog 
alerted when it sniffed his bag; 1,063 grams of cocaine 
were found. The Ninth Circuit held the stop invalid, find-
ing that the DEA agents did not have reasonable suspi-
cion to stop. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Under Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), the police can stop and briefly detain a 
person if the officer has reasonable suspicion supported 
by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. In 
determining reasonable suspicion, the courts look at the 
totality of the circumstances. According to the Court, the 
facts supported a finding of reasonable suspicion, a stan-
dard which requires less than a showing of probable 
cause. The use of an alias, although not determinative, is 
a relevant fact. The use of cash, amounting to $2,100 and 
paid in $20 bills, is also relevant. Moreover, few travelers 
would spend 20 hours on a flight and then only 48 hours 
in Miami before returning home. "Any one of these 
factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is 
quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken 
together they amount to reasonable suspicion." /d. at 
1586. 
The fact that some of these factors are part of the DEA 
drug courier profile did not undercut their validity. The 
Court wrote: 
A court sitting to determine the existence of reasona-
ble suspicion must require the agent to articulate the 
factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that 
these factors may be set forth in a "profile" does not 
somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as 
seen by a trained agent. !d. at 1587. 
Drug Testing 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 
S. Ct. 1384 (1989), involved the urinalysis program oper-
ated by the United States Customs Service. One of the 
Service's responsibilities is the seizure of contraband, 
including illegal drugs. Employees who sought a transfer 
or promotion to certain positions were subject to drug 
testing-those involved in drug interdiction, those who 
carried weapons, and those who dealt with classified 
information. The Union challenged the testing program, 
arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment rights of 
the employees. 
The Supreme Court upheld the testing program, at 
least as it applied to those employees who were involved 
in drug interdiction or who carried firearms. Initially, the 
Court concluded that the urinanalysis program was a 
governmental search and thus subject to the Fourth 
Amendment. Accordingly, the critical question was 
whether the search was reasonable. Typically, a reasona-
ble search is one based upon a warrant and probable 
cause. However, if a special governmental need is 
involved, these requirements may be dispensed with: 
[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special 
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's 
private expectations against the Government's interest 
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to determine whether it is impractical to require a 
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the 
particular context. /d. at 1390. 
Here, the Court believed that the warrant requirement 
would not provide much additional protection for t. 
employees but would exact a substantial cost to the Serv- ~~ 
ice. Under the program, drug testing was limited to 
narrowly defined situations, and employees who sought 
promotion or transfer were aware of these requirements. 
There would be no special facts for a neutral and 
detached magistrate to evaluate. 
Next, the Court considered the probable cause 
requirement. Prior cases had established an exception to 
this requirement for certain types of administrative 
searches: 
[T]he traditional probable-cause standard may be 
unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of routine 
administrative functions, ... especially where the 
Government seeks to prevent the development of 
hazardous conditions or to detect violations that rarely 
generate articulable grounds for searching any partic-
ular place or person ... Our precedents have settled 
that, in certain limited circumstances, the Govern-
ment's need to discover such latent or hidden condi-
tions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently 
compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed 
by conducting such searches without any measure of 
individualized suspicion./d. at 1392. 
The Court went on to hold that the Government's 
interest was sufficiently compelling to validate the testing 
program as it applied to those who were involved in drug 
interdiction and those who carried weapons. Moreover, ~ 
Customs employees in these categories have a , 
diminished expectation of privacy. "Unlike most private 
citizens or government employees in general, employees 
involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect 
effective inquiry into their fitness and probity." /d. at 1394. 
The Court believed that the record had not been suffi-
ciently developed to make such a determination concern-
ing employees who handled classified material and thus 
remanded on that issue. 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 
1402 (1989), involved the constitutionality of a drug test-
ing program that covered railroad employees. The 
program was implemented under the authority of the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act. It required testing after most 
railroad accidents and permitted testing under certain 
other conditions. The Court's analysis paralleled that of 
Von Raab. It first concluded that the testing program was 
a governmental search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Then it considered the reasonableness of the procedure, 
balancing the need against the privacy intrusion. Again, 
the Court upheld the search as reasonable. 
CONFESSIONS 
Miranda-Custody 
While driving, the defendant in Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 
109 S. Ct. 205 (1988), was stopped by the police for traffic t 
violations. After the officer smelled alcohol and observed -111 
stumbling movements, he administered a field sobriety 
test. The officer also asked about alcohol use, and 
Bruder responded that he had been drinking. When 
Bruder failed the sobriety test, he was arrested. His 
incriminatory statements were admitted at trial. A state 
appellate court, however, ruled the statements inadmissi-
ble as violative of Miranda. 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. According to 
the Court, the case was controlled by Berke mer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), which held that persons 
subjected to temporary traffic stops were not entitled to 
Miranda warnings. Although the person is seized within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, there is nb 
"custodial interrogation," the triggering mechanism for 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
In other words, only persons in custody are entitled to 
Miranda warnings, and a traffic stop does not amount to 
custody. This rule was based on two factors. First, traffic 
stops were usually brief, unlike the station house interro-
gations discussed in Miranda. Second, traffic stops 
commonly occur in public, a situation far removed from 
the police dominated stationhouse depicted in Miranda. 
Once a person is arrested, however, Miranda warnings 
are required. In a footnote the Court indicated that 
detaining a suspect for "over one-half an hour" and 
questioning him in a "patrol car" would also trigger the 
Miranda safeguards, even in the absence of a formal 
arrest. 
Miranda - Warnings 
Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989), involved 
the adequacy of warnings given pursuant to Miranda. 
Before confessing to attempted murder, Eagan was given 
warnings, which included the advice that a lawyer would 
be appointed "if and when you go to court." Eagan 
argued that this advice suggested that a suspect is not 
entitled to counsel unless charges are filed against him, 
and that only those who can afford an attorney are enti-
tled to one before questioning. 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected these argu-
ments. The Court noted that it had "never insisted that 
Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in 
that decision." /d. at 2879. In California v. Prysock, 453 
U.S. 355 (1981), the Court had remarked that "the 'rigidi-
ty' of Miranda [does not] exten[d] to the precise formula-
tion of the warnings given a criminal defendant," and that 
"no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy its stric-
tures." /d. at 359. 
In this case the Court believed that the warnings, as a 
whole, conveyed the information required by Miranda. 
The initial warnings included the following statement: 
"You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we 
ask you any questions, and to have him with you during 
questioning." In addition, Eagan was told that he had the 
right to the. advice and presence of a lawyer even if he 
could not afford to hire one, and that he had the right to 
stop answering questions until he talked to a lawyer. 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
The defendant in Olden v. Kentucky, 109 S.Ct. 480 
(1988), was charged with kidnaping, rape, and sodomy. 
The alleged victim testified that Olden had tricked her 
into leaving a bar and then raped her with the assistance 
of a codefendant. She was then driven to the house of 
Bill Russell, where she was released. Russell also testi-
fied as a prosecution witness. He told the jury that he 
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witnessed the victim leaving the car and that she told him 
immediately that she had been raped. 
The defense contended that the act of intercourse was 
consensual. The defense theory was that the victim and 
Russell were having an extramarital relationship and that 
the rape story was made up to explain why she was 
disembarking from the defendant's car. By the time of the 
trial, the victim and Russell were living together, but the 
trial judge refused to permit cross-examination about this 
fact. The judge believed that this information would prej-
udice the jury against the victim because she was white 
and Russell was black. The jury acquitted the codefen-
dant and convicted Olden of sodomy only. 
On review the Supreme Court reversed per curiam. 
The right of confrontation includes the right to conduct 
reasonable cross-examination. In particular, "exposure of 
a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and impor-
tant function of the constitutionally protected right of 
cross-examination." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 
(1974). The Court's cases consistently reaffirm this right. 
For example, the Court recently held that 
a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confron-
tation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from 
engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination 
designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the 
part of the witness, and thereby "to expose to the jury 
the facts f(om which jurors ... could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the 
witness." Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 
(1986), quoting Davis, supra, at 415 U.S. at 318. 
In this case Olden had consistently maintained that the 
alleged victim lied because she feared jeopardizing her 
relationship with Russell. Thus, inquiry into her current 
living arrangement with Russell would have been rele-
vant to impeachment. Foreclosure of this line of question-
ing violated Olden's right of confrontation. Moreover, this 
error could not be considered harmless-especially in 
light of the jury's inconsistent verdict and acquittal of the 
codefendant. 
PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE 
In Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), a 
10-year old boy was kidnaped and sodomized. After he 
was released, his mother took him to a hospital, where a 
physician treated him for rectal injuries. The doctor also 
used a "sexual assault kit" to collect evidence. This 
involved the use of swabs to collect samples, which are 
then transferred to slides. The slides were turned over to 
the police, who placed them in a secure refrigerator. The 
boy's clothing was also collected, but it was not refriger-
ated or frozen. Tests to determine whether sexual contact 
had occurred were conducted, but further tests to identify 
blood group substances were not conducted. Nor were 
tests performed on the clothing until much later. Young-
blood was eventually identified and charged based on a 
photo display. His conviction was subsequently over-
turned by an Arizona appellate court because expert 
testimony indicated that timely tests on properly 
preserved semen samples could have produced results 
that might have exonerated him. According to the court, 
this failure to preserve the evidence violated due process. 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. The issue 
raised went beyond the Brady line of cases, which 
requiretf1e prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence 
to the defense. Brady v. 1\/laryiani:l, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Here, the 
prosecution disc:losed all the relevant material. What it 
failed to do was test the evidence immediately or 
preserve it in a way that would permit the defendant to 
test it later. 
A recent case; California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 
(1984), raised a similar issue. In that case the defendant 
sought to suppress the results of an intoxication test 
because the State had failed to preserve breath samples. 
The Court rejected the due process argument because 
the State had acted in good faith; the chance of exculpa-
tion had the sample been preserved was slim, and alter-
nativeways of contesting the test results were available. 
In Youngblood the Court focused on the good faith 
requirement. While good faith is not a requirement in the 
Brady-suppression cases, the Court believed it was 
determinative in a failure to preserve situation: "We 
therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show 
bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve 
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of 
due process of law." 109 S.Ct. at 337. According to the 
Court, the record possibly showed negligence but not 
bad faith. 
PRESUMPTIONS 
The defendant in Carella v. California, 109 S. Ct. 2419 
(1989), was convicted of grand theft for failure to return a 
rental car. The jury instructions adopted two statutory 
presumptions. One required the jury to find intent to 
commit theft by fraud if a rental car is not returned within 
20 days after a demand is made by the owner. The other 
presumption-reqiiifecrtlie~jury to return a finding of 
embezzlement if a rental car is not return within five days 
of the expiration of thelerase. · 
The Supreme Court found these instructions uncon-
stitutional. Due Process requires the State to establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970). Jury instructions that relieve the State of this 
burden are constitutionally suspect. Francis v. Franklin, 
471 U.S. 307 (1985)." Such directions subvert the 
presumption of innocence accorded to accused persons, 
and also invade the truth-finding task assigned solely to 
juries in criminal cases." 109 S. Ct. at 2420. Since the 
instructions in question were mandatory directives to the 
jury, they "directly foreclosed independent jury consider-
ation ofwhether the facts proved established certain 
elements of the offenses ... " and they "also relieved the 
State of its burden of proof articulated in Winship, namely 
proving by evidE;Jnce every essential element of Carella's 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." /d. 
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
Blanton v. City of North las Vegas, 109 S.Ct. 1289 
(1989), involved the petty offense exception to the right to 
trial by jury. Blanton was charged with driving under the 
influence, which carried a maximum prison term of six 
months. His request for a jury trial was denied, and he 
appealed on this ground. 
The Court had long recognized "a category of petty 
crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial provision." Duncan v. Louisiana, 
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391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). The principal issue is how to 
define this category. The Court's early cases focused on 
the nature of the crime and whether the crime was one 
triable by jury at common law. later cases, however, 
sought a more objective standard. By the time Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), was decided, a plurality of 
the Court stated: "[W]e have found the most relevant 
such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized 
penalty." /d. at 68. In Baldwin the Court held that the right 
to jury trial was triggered whenever the charged crime 
carries a maximum authorized prison term greater than 
six months. The Court, however, did not rule that a maxi-
mum term of less th?n $iX months imprisonment would 
always be a petty offense. It left open the possibility that a 
jury trial could be required, at least in some cases, even if 
the maximum prison term was less than six months. 
In Blanton the Court reaffirmed this possibility. A crime 
punishable with a prison term less than six months was 
presumed to be a petty crime, but this presumption could 
be rebutted. 
A defendant is entitled to jury trial in such circum-
stances only if he can demonstrate that any additional 
statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the 
maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so 
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determina-
tion that the offense in question is a "serious" one. 
This standard, albeit somewhat imprecise, should 
ensure the availability of a jury trial in the rare situation 
where a legislature packs an offense it deems "seri-
ous" with onerous penalties that nonetheless "do not 
puncture the 6-month incarceration line." 109 S.Ct. at 
1293. 
Applying this standard, the Court found that Blanton 
was not entitled to a jury trial. The fact that a minimum 
term may be imposed was considered irrelevant by the 
Court. Likewise, a 90-day license suspension did not take 
DUI out of the petty offense category. One other aspect 
of the statute was considered. In lieu of prison, a DUI 
offender may be ordered to perform 48 hours of commu-
nity service dressed in clothing identifying him as a DUI 
offender. This scheme, however, did not make DUI a 
"serious" offense, according to the Court. 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Right to Consult 
The defendant in Perry v. Leeke, 109 S.Ct. 594 (1989), 
was convicted of murder, kidnaping, and sexual assault. 
He claimed that he had not taken an active part in the 
homicide or kidnaping and that his participation in the 
sexual assault was due to duress. Evidence indicated 
that he was mildly retarded, nonviolent, and could be 
easily influenced by others. Perry took the stand after a 
lunch recess. At the conclusion of the direct examination, 
the trial judge ordered a 15-minute recess. He also 
ordered Perry not to talk to anyone, including his defense 
counsel. 
Perry asserted that this order violated his right to coun-
sel, an argument based on Geders v. United States, 425 
U.S. 80 (1976). In Geders the trial court ordered the defen-
dant not to consult with his attorney during an overnight 
recess. 
The Court ruled that this order interfered with the right 
to counsel. In Perry, however, the Court held Geders inap-
plicable. The Court ruled that the right to consult with an 
attorney was not operative in this context: 
[W]hen a defendant becomes a witness, he has no 
constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he 
is testifying. He has an absolute right to such consulta-
tion before he begins to testify, but neither he nor his 
lawyer has a right to have the testimony interrupted in 
order to give him the benefit of counsel's advice. 109 
S.Ct. at 600. 
Once the accused takes the stand, he is subject to 
cross-examination, and often cross-examination 
"depends tor its effectiveness on the ability of counsel to 
punch holes in a witness' testimony at just the right time, 
in just the right way." /d. at 601. Permitting consultation 
between direct and cross-examination "grants the 
witness an opportunity to regroup and regain a poise and 
sense of strategy that the unaided witness would not 
possess." /d. Accordingly, the trial court could refuse a 
recess during the taking of testimony. It this is so, the 
"judge must also have the power to maintain the status 
quo during a brief recess in which there is a virtual 
certainty that any conversation between the witness and 
lawyer would relate to the ongoing testimony." /d. 
The Court distinguished Geders because it involved an 
overnight recess. In such a situation consultation would 
cover subjects other than the defendant's testimony. For 
example, trial tactics and plea negotiations might be 
discussed. On such matters the defendant has a right to 
consult with his attorney. 
Anders Brief 
Penson v. Ohio, 109 S.Ct. 346 (1988), involved the 
application of an earlier decision, Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967). Prior to Anders the Court had held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a criminal 
defendant the right to counsel on a first appeal as of 
right. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). In 
Anders the Court held that this right could not be denied 
based on counsel's bare assertion that the appeal was 
without merit. If appellate counsel concluded that the 
appeal was frivolous, he could move to withdraw. The 
motion, however, had to be "accompanied by a brief 
referring to anything in the record that might arguably 
support the appeal." /d. at 744. Moreover, the appellate 
court must conduct its own examination of the record to 
determine if the appeal is frivolous. 
In Penson appellate counsel submitted a certification 
of a frivolous appeal. The court of appeals permitted the 
withdrawal even though a briefhad not accompanied the 
certification and before the court had reviewed the 
record. When the court did review the record, it conclud-
ed that counsel's certification that the appeal was with-
out merit was "highly questionable." The court found 
several arguable claims. Indeed, the court found that 
plain error had been committed in one jury instruction. It 
reversed on that count, but upheld the conviction on the 
remaining counts. 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. According to 
the Court, the process was flawed in several respects. 
First, appellate counsel should not have been permitted 
to withdraw without first submitting an Anders brief. 
Counsel's failure to tile such a brief lett the Ohio 
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court without an adequate basis tor determining that 
he had performed his duty carefully to search the case 
tor arguable error and also deprived the court of the 
assistance of an advocate in its own review of the cold 
record on appeal. 109 S.Ct. at 351. 
Second, the court erred by permitting the withdrawal 
prior to its own examination of the record. Finally, and 
"most significantly," the court tailed to appoint new coun-
sel after it determined that several arguable claims exist-
ed. Once the court recognized a nonfrivolous claim, the 
appellant is entitled to counsel under Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Anders is a limited exception, 
applicable only when there is no merit in an appeal. This 
much is clear from the Court's prior cases. In McCoy v. 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 108 S.Ct. 1895 (1988), the 
Court had written: "Of course, it the court concludes that 
there are nonfrivolous issues to be raised, it must appoint 
counsel to pursue the appeal and direct that counsel to 
prepare an advocate's brief before deciding the merits." 
/d. at 1904-05. 
Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees 
Christopher Reckmeyer was indicted on drug charges. 
Pursuant to a federal forfeiture statute, the indictment 
sought forfeiture of specified assets in Reckmeyer's 
possession. Reckmeyer and his attorneys from the firm 
of Caplin & Drysdale sought to exempt attorney fees from 
forfeiture. Petitioner argued that the statute infringes on 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and the 
due process guarantee. The Court rejected both argu-
ments. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 
109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). 
The right to counsel of choice is a limited right. It a 
defendant can afford counsel, the prosecution is general-
ly prohibited from interfering with his choice. However, a 
"defendant may not insist on representation by an attor-
ney he cannot afford." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 
153, 159 (1988). The forfeiture of assets intended as 
payment of attorney fees does not, according to the 
Court, infringe upon this limited right. Simply put, the 
money is not the defendant's to spend in the first place. 
A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to 
spend another person's money tor services rendered 
by an attorney, even if those funds are the only way 
that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of 
his choice. A robbery suspect, for example, has no 
Sixth Amendment right to use funds he has stolen 
from a bank to retain an attorney to defend him if he is 
apprehended. 109 S. Ct. at 2652. 
The same is true with forfeiture, which under the 
applicable statutes, vests title in the United States at the 
time of the criminal act giving rise to forfeiture. Moreover, 
the Court found the Government's interest in forfeiture to 
be substantial; such funds are used to support law 
enforcement activity, to permit the return of property to 
rightful owners, and to undermine the economic power of 
organized crime and drug enterprises. 
GUILTY PLEAS 
In United States v. Broce, 109 S. Ct. 757 (1989), the 
defendants, Ray Broce and Broce Construction Co., 
were charged with rigging bids and suppressing compe-
tition tor highway projects. Two indictments were 
returned-one relating to bids on a particular project in 
April1978 and anotlier for a different project in July 1979. 
Both defendants pleaded guilty to both indictments. 
Subsequently, the defendants attacked their convictions 
on the ground that only one conspiracy was involved 
rather than two." Different defendants charged with 
rigging bids had prevailed on this theory. The Tenth 
Circuit accepted this argument and reversed. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. By pleading guilty to 
two agreements, which started at different times and 
embraced different objectives, the defendants conceded 
guilt to two separate offenses. Even if they miscalculated, 
they are estopped from challenging the plea. They had 
the opportunity to go to trial and dispute the "two 
conspiracy" theory but chose to forego that right. The 
Court's cases had held that such erroneous assessment 
did not invalidate a voluntary plea. In Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Court wrote: 
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely 
because he discovers long after the plea has been 
accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality 
of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to 
alternative courses of action. More particularly, absent 
misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by 
state agents, a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently 
made in light of the then applicable law does not 
become vulnerable because later judicial decisions 
indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise. /d. at 
757. 
Accordingly, the general rule is that "a voluntary and 
intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, 
who has been advised by competent counsel, may not 
be collaterally attacked." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 
508 (1984). Although the Court had recognized excep-
tions to this rule, those exceptions were held to be 
inapplicable. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Retrial- Sufficiency of Evidence 
The defendant in Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S.Ct. 285 
(1988), was sentenced to an enhanced prison term under 
a state habitual offender statute. The statute became 
operative if a defendant had been convicted of four prior 
offenses. In a later habeas proceeding, the defendant 
was able to show that one of the prior convictions had 
been the subject of a pardon, and thus could not be used 
for enhancement. The State, however, announced that it 
would introduce a different conviction, which it had not 
previously used, to bring the defendant within the 
recidivist statute. The defendant objected on double 
jeopardy grounds, arguing that without the pardoned 
conviction, there was insufficient evidence-in effect, an 
acquittal on the recidivist count. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The prohi-
bition against successive prosecutions does not bar a 
retrial of a defendant who succeeds in gaining a reversal 
on appeal or in collateral proceedings. United States v. 
Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 
463 (1964). The Court recognized an exception to this 
rule in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), for those 
cases where the sole grounds for a reversal is the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. The Court believed that reversal 
on this ground was the equivalent of an acquittal, which 
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historically had provided absolute immunity from 
reprosecution. 
The defendant in Nelson argued that his case was 
governed by Burks. Here, the conviction was reversed 
because evidence had been erroneously admitted and 
the court determined that without the inadmissible 
evidence, there was insufficient evidence to convict. The 
Supreme Court, however, saw a difference. Burks was 
based on a distinction between reversals involving trial 
errors and those involving insufficient evidence. Nelson's 
reversal was based on a trial error, and a retrial would 
afford him the opportunity to obtain a fair readjudication 
of guilt free from,error. Moreover, had he successfully 
objected to the inadmissible evidence at trial, the prose-
cutor would have had the opportunity to introduce a 
different prior conviction to support the recidivist charge. 
Civil Sanctions 
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989), 
involved a civil penalty which the Court decided 
constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
Halper was convicted of submitting 65 false claims under 
the federal Medicare program. While working for a medi-
cal laboratory, he submitted claims for a $12.00 reim-
bursement when the cost of the procedure should have 
been $3.00. The total amount of the fraud was $585. He 
was convicted on all65 counts as well as 16 counts of 
mail fraud. He was subsequently sentenced to imprison-
ment for two years and fined $5,000. 
The Government then instituted a civil action under the 
False Claims Act. Based on the criminal verdict, the trial 
court granted summary judgment. Under the act, a 
person is liable for $2000 plus two times the amount of 
damages for each count. Thus, a statutory penalty of 
more than $130,000 was required. 
Halper argued that this penalty constituted double 
punishment in violation of the double jeopardy guaran-
tee, and the Supreme Court agreed. The Court 
acknowledged that both a civil and criminal penalty may 
be imposed for the same conduct, and determining 
whether a penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statuto-
ry construction. The issue, in the Court's view, was 
whether the civil penalty was punitive rather than 
compensatory. The legislature's labeling of the penalty 
as criminal or civil was not determinative. Instead, wheth-
er the penalty served the aims of retribution and deter-
rence controlled. 
We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in 
a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an 
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second 
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, 
but only as a deterrent or retribution. /d. at 1902. 
The Court went on to comment that the line between 
remedial and punitive is often not precise, and that there-
fore reasonable liquidated damages and fixed-penalty-
plus-double-damage provisions would be permissible. 
However, the present case went beyond these accepta-
ble means of establishing damages. The "civil penalty 
sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational 
relation to the goal of compensating the Government for 
its loss, but rather appears to qualify as 'punishment' in 
the plain meaning of the word." /d. 
J 
DEATH PENALTY 
Right to Counsel 
Joseph Giarratano, a death row inmate in Virginia, 
initiated a 1983 action against state officials, arguing that 
he had a right to appointed counsel while pursuing 
collateral relief in connection with his death sentence. 
The Court rejected this argument. Murray v. Giarratano, 
109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989). 
The Court held that its prior cases did not support a 
right to counsel in this context. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963), recognized a right to counsel at trial, and 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), recognized 
such a right for the initial appeal. However, the Court 
drew the line in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), in 
which it had held that the right to counsel does not 
extend to discretionary appeals. The function of counsel 
differs at different stages of the criminal process. At the 
trial the State is haling the defendant into court and 
attempting to overcome the presumption of innocence. 
The defendant needs counsel as a shield. In contrast, at 
the appellate stage, the defendant uses counsel as a 
sword to upset a presumptively valid adjudication of guilt. 
Consequently, the justification for counsel differs. 
Based on this rationale, the Court had held in Pennsyl-
vania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), that there was no 
federal constitutional right to appointed counsel for indi-
gent prisoners seeking state postconviction relief. Giar-
ratano, however, argued that Finley did not control in 
death penalty cases. The Court disagreed. State collater-
al proceedings are not constitutionally required and 
serve a more limited purpose than either the trial or 
appeal. Moreover, while the Eighth Amendment some-
times imposes higher standards at the trial stage of capi-
tal cases, it does not necessarily impose higher 
standards during the appellate or collateral review 
stages. 
Retarded Prisoners 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), concerned 
the execution of the retarded. Penry was convicted of 
rape and murder. He was diagnosed as having organic 
brain damage and had an 10 between 50 and 63, which 
indicates mild to moderate retardation. His mental age 
was 6 and 1/2, and his social maturity was that of a 9 or 
10 year old. The jury rejected his insanity defense and he 
was sentenced to death. 
One of the issues before the Court was whether the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a mentally 
retarded person with Penry's reasoning ability. The prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment recognizes 
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society." Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86, 101 (1958) (plurality). In determining such "evolving 
standards," the Court has looked to objective evidence of 
how society views a particular punishment today, as 
evidenced by legislative enactments and jury 
sentencing. 
Initially, the Court traced the evolution of the treatment 
of the retarded at common law. Here, the evidence 
supports the proposition that the common law prohibition 
against the execution of "idiots" would make their execu-
tion cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
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Amendment. Such persons would be profoundly or 
severely retarded and lack the capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their actions. They, however, would rare-
ly reach the point of execution. The insanity defense 
would shield most from conviction. Moreover, the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane; that is, 
someone who is not aware of the punishment or why they 
are about to suffer it. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 
(1986). 
Penry, however, did not fall in this category. He is mildly 
retarded. He was found competent to stand trial, and the 
jury rejected his insanity defense. Moreover, only one 
state prohibits the execution of the retarded. Ford v. Wain-
wright was easily distinguished because no state permit-
ted the execution of the insane and 26 states explicitly 
forbid it. Finally, there was no other compelling evidence 
of a national consensus on this issue. Accordingly, the 
Court rejected this aspect of Penry's argument. 
Penry did succeed, however, on another argument. 
The trial court had failed to instruct the jury that it could 
consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence of 
mental retardation in determining the appropriateness of 
the death penalty. Such consideration was required by 
earlier cases. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
Juveniles 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), required 
the Court to determine whether the imposition of the 
death penalty on persons who committed crimes at the 
age of 16 or 17 violated the Eighth Amendment. In the 
preceding term the Court had concluded that the 
Amendment was violated by the execution of a juvenile 
who had been 15 years old at the time of the offense. 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988). The 
deciding vote in that case, however, was cast by Justice 
O'Connor. She again cast the deciding vote in Stanford, 
but this time she found no constitutional violation. She 
distinguished Thompson. Unlike that case, "it is suffi-
ciently clear that no national consensus forbids the impo-
sition of capital punishment on 16 or 17-year old capital 
murderers." /d. at 2981. 
